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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of concession 
revenue sharing between an airport and its airlines. It 
is found that the degree of revenue sharing will be 
affected by how carriers’ services are related 
(complements, independent, or substitutes). In 
particular, when carriers provide substitutable 
services, the sharing proportions might become 
negative if horizontal substitutability is sufficiently 
strong. In these situations, while revenue sharing 
improves profit, it reduces social welfare. It is 
further found that airport competition results in a 
higher degree of revenue sharing than would be had 
in the case of single airports. Nevertheless, the 
airport-airline chains may derive lower profits 
through this revenue-sharing rivalry, and the 
situation is similar to a classic Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
As the airport-airline chains move further away from 
their joint profit maximum, social welfare rises 
beyond the level achievable by single airports. Our 
analysis also shows that the (equilibrium) 
revenue-sharing proportion at an airport decreases in 
the number of its carriers, and increases in the 
number of carriers at the competing airports. Finally, 
the effects of the pure sharing contract are compared 
with those of the two-part sharing contract. 
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1. Introduction 
An airport derives revenue from two facets of 
business: the traditional aeronautical operations and 
the commercial (concession) operations. The former 
refer to aviation activities associated with runways, 
aircraft parking and terminals, whereas the latter 
refer to non-aeronautical activities occurring within 
terminals and on airport land, including terminal 
concessions, and car parking and rental. For the last 
two decades, commercial revenues have grown faster 
than aeronautical revenues; as a result, they become 
the main income source of many airports. At medium 
to large US airports, for instance, commercial 
business represents 75-80% of the total airport 
revenue (Doganis, 1992). ATRS (2008) studied 142 
airports worldwide and found a majority of these 
airports derived 40-75% of their total revenues from 
non-aviation services, a major part of which is 
revenue from concession services (with large hub 
airports relying, on average, even more on 
concession income). Furthermore, commercial 
operations tend to be more profitable than 
aeronautical operations (e.g., Jones et al., 1993; 
Starkie, 2001; Francis et al., 2004), owing partly to 
prevailing regulations and charging mechanisms 
(e.g., Starkie, 2001). 
 
Paralleling the growth of concession revenues, 
revenue sharing between airports and airlines is 
getting popular in practice. As documented in Fu and 
Zhang (2009), there are cases, such as Tampa 
International Airport in the US and Ryanair in 
Europe, where airports and airlines share concession 
revenues.1 In many other cases, revenue sharing is 
in effect when airports allow airlines to hold shares 
or directly control airport facilities. For example, 
Terminal 2 of Munich airport was jointly invested by 
the airport operating company FMG (60%) and 
Lufthansa (40%), which is the airport’s dominant 
carrier (Kuchinke and Sickmann, 2005). Commercial 
profits generated from this terminal are thus shared 
between FMG and Lufthansa. Fu and Zhang (2009) 
found that concession revenue sharing has important 
competitive and welfare implications: it allows the 
airport and airlines to internalize a multi-output 
                                                 
1 Tampa International Airport has been sharing revenue with its 
carriers for several years. In 2004, it shared $7 million out of a 
total budget of $30 million (see the 2004 Annual Report of Tampa 
International Airport). On the other hand, Ryanair has identified 
airport car parking as one of its business opportunities and 
cooperated with the leading airport parking company BCP. In its 
negotiations with some airports, Ryanair asked for parking 
revenue sharing as a condition to serve the airports (Fu and Zhang, 
2009). 
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complementarity between the passenger flights and 
the concession consumption brought about by the 
flights, which may improve welfare. Essentially, 
passengers traveling through the airport also create a 
demand for concession consumption. As an airport 
depends on airlines to bring in passengers, sharing 
some of its concession revenues with the carriers 
will encourage them to expand output, which may in 
turn improve profit of the whole airport-airlines 
chain as well as social welfare. However, revenue 
sharing can cause a negative effect on airline 
competition as an airport may strategically share 
revenue with its dominant airlines, further 
strengthening these firms’ market power. The US 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has 
expressed concerns over airports’ practice of offering 
particular airlines favorable terms, because such a 
special treatment of one particular airline may harm 
competition in the (downstream) airline markets 
(FAA, 1999). 2  Since 1995, the competition 
authority of  the European Union, and later the 
European Commission, have ruled against several 
major airports in Belgium, Finland and Portugal 
concerning their practice of charging lower prices to 
home carriers (Barbot, 2006, 2009a).  
 
For the last several years, the effects of vertical 
relationships between airports and airlines have 
received growing attention from researchers. In 
addition to Fu and Zhang (2009), Auerbach and 
Koch (2007) and Barbot (2009a, 2009b) found that 
cooperation between an airport and its airlines can 
bring benefits to the alliance members in terms of 
increased traffic volume and operation efficiency. In 
this paper we extend the previous work on 
airport-airline vertical cooperation, focusing on the 
effects of concession revenue sharing. More 
specifically, we consider that carriers may provide 
complementary, independent or substitutable 
services, and that the proportions of revenue sharing 
may be outside of the range of [0, 1]. The latter 
allows us to compare alternative sharing 
arrangements. Further, unlike the previous studies, 
our analysis is conducted with general demand and 
cost functional forms. 
 
We find that the degree of sharing will be 
affected by how carriers’ services are related to each 
other. In particular, when carriers provide 
                                                 
2 Previous studies (e.g., FAA, 1999; GAO, 1997; Dresner et al., 
2002; see also Hartmann, 2006, for a useful review on the topic) 
suggest that airline entry may be deterred if the dominant airline 
controls key airport facilities. Apparently, such a strategy by the 
dominant carrier would require at least implicit 
consent/cooperation from the airport. In the US, large and medium 
airports that meet a certain threshold of airline concentration are 
now required to submit competition plans as mandated by the 
‘Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st 
Century’ legislated in 2000. 
substitutable services, the sharing proportions might 
become negative if horizontal substitutability is 
sufficiently strong and the fixed (transfer) payments 
between the airport and carriers are feasible (referred 
to as the ‘two-part revenue sharing’). The negative 
sharing allows the airport to penalize the 
over-competing airlines so as to support prices in the 
output market and improve profit. In these situations, 
while revenue sharing improves the total 
airport-airlines channel profit, it reduces social 
welfare. If the fixed payments are not feasible, under 
the resulting ‘pure revenue sharing’ the airport will, 
for the cases of independent or complementary 
services, share less concession revenue with its 
carriers than would be under the two-part revenue 
sharing. For the substitutes case however, the 
sharing-proportions comparison between the two 
types is in general ambiguous. In the special case of 
negative sharing, the pure revenue sharing results in 
not only a higher sharing proportion, but also a 
higher welfare level if carriers are sufficiently 
symmetric, than the two-part revenue sharing. 
 
Our second objective in this paper is to 
investigate revenue sharing for multiple, competing 
airports. In general, very few papers in the airport 
literature have examined the case of competing 
airports analytically.3 This is understandable given 
the local monopoly nature of an airport. The 
situation is changing, however. The world has 
experienced a rapid growth in air transport demand 
since the 1970s, and many airports have been built or 
expanded as a result. This has led to a number of 
multi-airport regions such as greater London in the 
UK and several metropolitan areas in the US (e.g., 
San Francisco, Chicago, New York, Washington, 
Dallas, Detroit, Huston, and Los Angeles) within 
which airports may compete with each other. At the 
same time, the dramatic growth of low-cost carriers 
(e.g., Southwest Airlines in the US and Ryanair in 
Europe) has enabled some smaller and peripheral 
airports to cut into the catchment areas of large 
airports. Starkie (2008) conducted an overview of 
UK airports from the perspective of a business 
enterprise. He concluded that effective competition 
between airports is possible and a competitive airport 
industry can be financially viable. Taken together, 
these observations suggest that it is important to 
investigate the effects of revenue sharing in the 
                                                 
3 For example, Fu and Zhang (2009) examined revenue sharing 
only for a monopoly airport. The few exceptions include Gillen 
and Morrison (2003), who examined two competing airports in 
the context of a full-service carrier and a low-cost carrier. More 
recently, Basso and Zhang (2007) provided a general examination 
of airport competition with congestion and non-atomistic airlines 
at each airport, and Barbot (2009a) examined airport-airline 
interactions (collusion, in particular) using a spatial model similar 
to that of Basso and Zhang. The issues of concession revenues and 
revenue sharing were not considered in these papers. 
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context of multiple, competing airports. 
 
We find that airport competition will result in a 
higher degree of revenue sharing than would be had 
in the case of single airports. Nevertheless, the 
airport-airline chains may derive lower profits 
through this revenue-sharing rivalry: in effect, the 
airports are trapped by the incentive structure of the 
environment, and the situation is similar to a classic 
Prisoners’ Dilemma. As the airport-airline chains 
move further away from their joint profit maximum, 
social welfare rises beyond the level achievable by 
single airports. Our analysis also showed that airline 
market structure can have a bearing on revenue 
sharing arrangements at not only the airport in 
question, but also its competing airports. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
sets out the basic model and examines the 
revenue-sharing equilibrium for a single airport with 
multiple airlines. Section 3 examines revenue 
sharing for the general case of competing airports 
with each having an arbitrary number of carriers. 
Section 4 investigates the pure revenue sharing and 
compares its effects with those of the two-part 
revenue sharing. Section 5 contains concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Single Airport with Multiple Airlines  
 
2.1 Basic model 
Consider, in this section, that a single airport 
provides aeronautical service to airlines, for which it 
imposes a charge.4 In our modeling this charge is 
represented by a per-passenger fee w  (>0),  and is 
regulated and cannot be changed unilaterally by 
either the airport or airlines.5 We have two carriers, 
labeled as 2,1=i , operating from the airport, 
although the analysis and results extend immediately 
to the n-carrier case (see, e.g., Section 3.2). They 
face inverse demands ),( 21 qqp
i , which satisfy the 







1 >− pppp  
 with subscripts denoting partial derivatives.6 The 
                                                 
4 For example, at the Hong Kong airport this charge consists of 
runway charge, aircraft parking fee, and terminal building charge, 
with each component accounting for 68.7%, 6.6% and 24.7%, 
respectively (Zhang and Zhang, 2003). 
5  Since price discrimination (on aeronautical charges) by an 
airport is prohibited by the International Air Transport Association 
(IATA) rules, all airlines serving the airport face the same w. 







1 >− pppp  refers to 
the property of ‘own effects’ dominating ‘cross effects’ in demand 
airlines’ revenue from providing aviation service is 
then given by i
ii qqqpqqR ),(),( 2121 = . 
The revenue functions can be used to define 
how one carrier’s output is related to the other’s. 
There are three possible cases: i) Complements: two 
airlines offer complementary services in the sense 
that  




j qqqpqqR  
, 0),( 21 >qqR
i
ij ,         (1) 
i.e., increasing carrier j ’s output increases both the 
total and marginal revenues of carrier i  (here, and 
below, if the indices i  and j  appear in the same 
expression, then it is to be understood that ji ≠ .)7 
In the present context, services provided by a trunk 
airline and a feeder airline – with their passengers 
connecting at the airport – may be considered as 
complements. Another example would be that two 
airlines engage in some form of strategic alliances or 
code-sharing arrangements (e.g., Brueckner, 2001; 
Brueckner and Whalen, 2000.). ii) Independent 
services:  




j qqqpqqR ,  (2) 
i.e., the airlines’ services are unrelated in demand. 
(Note, in this case, that 0),( 21 =qqR
i
j  implies 
0),( 21 =qqR
i
ij .) (iii) Substitutes:  




j qqqpqqR , 
0),( 21 <qqR
i
ij ,                  (3) 
i.e., increasing carrier j ’s output reduces both the 
total and marginal revenues of carrier i . For instance, 
two competing trunk carriers likely provide 
substitutes at an airport, so do two competing feeder 
carriers. 
 
We consider that for each passenger going 
through the airport, a (net) concession revenue h  
(>0) is derived. 8  How this revenue is shared 
                                                                        
functions. As noted by Dixit (1986, p. 108), the dominance of 
own-effects over cross-effects is a standard assumption in models 
of oligopoly. 
7 The first inequality in (1) shows (gross) complements between 
the airline services, whereas the second inequality implies 
‘strategic complements’ (Bulow et al., 1985). That the former 
implies the latter holds for most (but not all) plausible demand 
structures; it certainly holds when demand functions are linear. In 
other words, the fact that services are complements is conducive 
to their strategic complementarity. Restricting attention to 
strategic complementarity is a standard practice in oligopoly 
models (Dixit, 1986; Tirole, 1988). Similar observations on 
‘substitutes’ and ‘strategic substitutes’ hold for the substitutes case 
discussed next. We shall, as is common in the literature, refer to 
these two cases simply as ‘complements’ and ‘substitutes.’ 
8 This formulation of concession surplus has been used in, e.g. 
Zhang and Zhang (1997, 2003), Oum et al. (2004) and Fu and 
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between the airport and airlines is modeled as a 
two-stage game. In the first stage, the airport offers 
carrier i to share proportion ir  of the revenue ihq  
in exchange for a fixed fee if , subject to the 
carrier’s participation constraint.9 In this two-part 
sharing arrangement, no restriction is imposed on ir ; 
consequently, ir  can be less than zero or greater 
than one. In the second stage, airlines interact with 
each other in Cournot fashion. 10  The subgame 
perfect equilibrium of this two-stage game is referred 
to as the ‘revenue sharing equilibrium.’ 
 
2.2. Revenue-sharing equilibrium 
The revenue-sharing equilibrium is solved in the 
standard backward fashion. 
Stage two:  Given sharing option ),( ii fr , each 
carrier’s profit is: 
iiiiii
ii fhqrwqqCqqRqq −+−−= )(),(),( 2121π , (4) 
where )( ii qC  denotes carrier i ’s production cost. 
Thus for carrier i , the total operating cost net of 
fixed payment if  equals iii wqqC +)( . The 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is characterized by the 
first-order conditions, 




iπ , (5) 
and the second-order conditions 




ii qCqqRqqπ . Both 







11 >−≡ ππππJ , are 
assumed to hold over the entire region of interest.11 
                                                                        
Zhang (2009). It is, nevertheless, a simple representation where 
concession surplus is strictly complementary to passenger volume. 
For an alternative and perhaps more realistic formulation, see 
Czerny (2006). 
9 Thus we investigate the effect of a ‘two part’ revenue-sharing 
scheme under which fixed payments are possible. Such a model 
can be used to examine the incentive for vertical airport-airline 
cooperation – i.e., taking account of the profit for an 
airport-airline channel as a whole – and may also be consistent 
with situations in which airports and airlines can commit to 
medium-/long-term cooperation. Nonetheless, such fixed 
payments between airports and airlines might not be feasible in 
certain situations, owing to the difficulty in their agreeing to the 
right amount of payments, or to the preference for simpler 
revenue-sharing arrangements that do not involve any 
medium-/long-term commitment. We will, in Section 4, examine a 
‘pure’ sharing contract that restricts fixed payments if  to zero.  
10 Recent studies on airport pricing and capacity investment that 
have incorporated imperfect competition of air carriers at an 
airport (e.g., Brueckner, 2002; Pels and Verhoef, 2004; Zhang and 
Zhang, 2006; Basso, 2008) have assumed Cournot behavior. 
Brander and Zhang (1990, 1993), for example, find some 
empirical evidence that rivalry between duopoly airlines is 
consistent with Cournot behavior. 
11 This assumption implies that the Cournot equilibrium exists 
and is unique (e.g., Friedman, 1977). Note that if carriers face 
The solution to (5) yields the second-stage 
equilibrium quantities, which are functions of the 
first-stage variables ),( 21 rr . (Since fixed payments 
1f  and 2f  enter the firms’ profit functions (4) as 
constants, they won’t affect the equilibrium 
quantities.) Denoting the equilibrium quantities as 
),( 21
* rrqi , substituting them into (5) and totally 
differentiating the resulting identity with respect to 
ir , we obtain 
Jhrq jjjii //
* π−=∂∂ , 
Jhrq jjiij //
* π=∂∂ .             (6) 
It follows immediately that 0/* >∂∂ ii rq , while 
ij rq ∂∂ /
*  having the same sign as jji
j
ji R=π , which 
by (1), (2) and (3) leads to: 
Lemma 1.  (i) 0/* >∂∂ ii rq ; and (ii) 
0/* >∂∂ ij rq , 0= , and 0<  for carriers’ 
producing complements, independent services, and 
substitutes, respectively.  
Thus an increase in the share of concession 
revenue to carrier i increases i’s output. The reason is 
that an increase in ir  will improve carrier i’s 
marginal profitability, owing to the multi-output 
complementarity between passenger flights and 
concession consumption. Furthermore, an increase in 
ir  increases, not affects, and decreases carrier j’s 
output if the carriers offer complementary, 
independent, and substitutable services, respectively. 
For the case of substitutes, since that 
0<= jji
j
ji Rπ  ensures a downward-sloping 
‘reaction function’ for each carrier (defined by (5) in 
the output space), an increase in ir  will, by 
increasing carrier i’s marginal profit, shift its reaction 
function outward. This will move the equilibrium 
quantities downward along j’s reaction function, 
thereby increasing *iq  and decreasing
*
jq . For 
complements, on the other hand, that 
0>= jji
j
ji Rπ  ensures an upward-sloping reaction 
function for each firm. An increase in ir  will again 
shift i’s reaction function outward, moving the 
equilibrium quantities upward along j’s reaction 
function, thereby increasing both *iq  and 
*
jq . 
Finally, if the services are independent, then an 
increase in ir  does not affect
*
jq , as expected.  
 
                                                                        
linear demands, then all these conditions will be satisfied. 
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Stage one:  Revenue-sharing structures therefore 
influence subsequent airline quantities, which in turn 
will affect the airport’s profit. Assume, for simplicity, 
that the airport’s fixed cost is zero and its marginal 
cost is constant and normalized to zero. The airport’s 









1 ])1()1[()( ffhqrhqrqqw ++−+−++⋅=Π , (7) 
where the second-stage equilibrium outputs are taken 
into account. There are three components inΠ : i) 
the aeronautical revenue (profit) given 
by )( 21 qqw +⋅ ; (ii) the residual concession 
revenue given by the bracketed term in (7); and (iii) 
the fixed payment collected from carriers, 21 ff + . 
The airport chooses ),( 21 rr  and ),( 21 ff  
to maximize Π . While if  won’t, as indicated 
above, affect the second-stage equilibrium outputs, 
1/ =∂Π∂ if  by (7). Consequently, the airport 
should, given its Stackelberg leader’s role, charge the 
airlines a fee as high as possible subject to their 
participation constraint ii 0ππ ≥ , with 
i
0π  being 
carrier i’s reservation profit, 2,1=i . Assume, 
without loss of generality, that each carrier receives 
its reservation profit. (Hence, all the benefits from 
improvements in performance go to the airport.) This 








1 )(),( π−+−−= , 
2,1=i ,                 (8) 
where equilibrium outputs *iq  are functions of 1r  












i ≡−+−=Π ∑ π . (9) 
Thus, the revenue-sharing equilibrium is 
characterized by the first-order conditions, 
0)/()/(/ ** =∂∂⋅+∂∂⋅=∂Π∂ ijjiiii rqvrqvr , 


















iii +−+= .          (11) 
Consider first the case where carriers’ services 
are independent. It can be easily seen from (10), (11) 
and (2) that the equilibrium sharing proportions are 
given by (superscript I for ‘independent services’): 
)/(1 hwr Ii += , 2,1=i ,  (12) 
which are strictly positive. Revenue sharing 
therefore improves the airport’s profit – here, the 
                                                 
12 Throughout the paper, we use capital letter Π  to denote 
airport profit, while lower case π  denoting airline profit.   
profit gain is due to the internalization of a demand 
complementarity between the flights and concession 
consumption. Further, even if 1=ir , the profit will 
rise with ir  going beyond the ‘full’ share. Basically, 
the two-part revenue sharing resolves the 
well-known ‘double marginalization’ problem in a 
vertical structure (e.g., Tirole, 1988).  
The independent-services case turns out to be a 
useful benchmark for the cases of substitutes and 











11 =∂∂⋅+∂∂⋅ rqvrqv ,    (13.2) 









12 =∂∂∂∂−∂∂∂∂⋅ rqrqrqrqv  
This equation, by (6), reduces further to 
2 1 2 1 2 2
2 12 21 11 22 2 2( ) / 0 0 0.v h J v h vπ π π π− = ⇒ − = ⇒ =  
Plugging 2 0v =  into (13.1) we immediately 
have 01 =v . It follows from (11) that 
[1 ( / )] ( / )ji ir w h R h= + + , 2,1=i .(14) 
If airline services are complements, then 0jiR > ; 
consequently (superscript C for ‘complements’), 
1 ( / )C Ii ir w h r> + = ,    2,1=i . (15) 
If airline services are substitutes, then 0jiR <  and 
so equation (14) yields (superscript S for 
‘substitutes’)  
1 ( / )S Ii ir w h r< + = ,   2,1=i . (16) 
 
The above discussion leads therefore to: 
Proposition 1.  At the revenue-sharing equilibrium 
with a single airport, the sharing proportions are 
)/(1 hwr Ii +=  when carriers’ services are 
independent, 2,1=i . The sharing proportions are 
greater (smaller, respectively) than Iir  when 
carriers produce complements (substitutes, 
respectively). 
 
The explanation for the deviations from the 
independent-services benchmark is straightforward. 
When services are complementary, the carriers are 
unable to internalize such complementarity by 
themselves. However, the airport, as a first mover, 
can achieve this by manipulating revenue-sharing 
proportions – here, by increasing the sharing 
proportions beyond Iir . In the substitutes case, on 
the other hand, horizontal (output) substitutability 
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will lead to a failure of coordination between 
competing airlines, resulting in their producing too 
much with respect to what would be best for them as 
a whole. Anticipating this, the airport uses revenue 
sharing as a device to coordinate airline competition 
downstream. In particular, a smaller sharing 
proportion than the independent-services benchmark 
will, by Lemma 1, reduce industry output, thus 
lessening excessive production by carriers.  
It is important to point out that for the 
substitutes case, the sharing proportions might 
become negative. This is because horizontal 
substitutability works in an opposite direction of the 
flights-concessions demand complementarity 
discussed above, in terms of the amount of 
production the airport would like to induce. The 
optimal level of revenue sharing, Sir , is set to 
balance these two effects. Thus, Sir  depends on the 
degree of substitutability between carriers’ services. 
Numerical examples are constructed at the end of 
this section, in which horizontal substitutability is so 
strong that Sir  become negative. 
 
2.3 Comparison with the no-sharing regime 
Our concern now is to compare the revenue-sharing 
equilibrium with the situation where airport-airline 
revenue sharing is not allowed, characterized 
by 0== ii fr . First, for the cases of complements 
and independent services, it is clear from Lemma 1 
and Proposition 1 that revenue sharing will increase 
output and improve profit. Define social welfare as 
















121 qqhqhqqCqCqqUrrW ϕ≡++−−= ,(17) 
where ),( 21 qqU  is the consumer utility function 
in the usual industry (partial equilibrium) analysis, 
with ii pqU =∂∂ / . Although passengers may 
derive surplus also from their concession 
consumption, such surplus per passenger is assumed 
constant and further normalized to zero, thus giving 
rise to formulation (17). Differentiating W  with 





i rqhCprqhCprW ∂∂+−+∂∂+−=∂∂ .(18) 
Since 0' >− i
i Cp  (positive markups in 
oligopoly), the output expansion identified above 
leads immediately to 0/ >∂∂ irW  and thus, 
revenue sharing improves welfare. 
As for prices, it can be easily seen (from below) 
that they will fall if carriers’ services are independent. 
For the complements case, the effect is not as 
straightforward. Differentiating ),( *2
*
1 qqp
i  with 












i rqprqprp ∂∂⋅+∂∂⋅=∂∂ ,(19.2) 
respectively. With carriers’ services being 
complementary, the first term on the right-hand side 
(RHS) of (19.1) is negative (recall 0<iip  and 
Lemma 1) whilst the second term is positive. 
Similarly, the first term on the RHS of (19.2) is 
negative whilst the second term is positive. Under 
‘symmetry’ however, the overall effects will be 
negative for both (19.1) and (19.2), as is shown 
below (Proposition 2). By ‘symmetry’ we mean (i) 
carriers have identical cost functions and face 
symmetric demands, and (ii) at the equilibrium, 
carriers have the same sharing contract (i.e., 21 rr =  
and 21 ff = ). The symmetry condition will also be 
used in the comparison for the substitutes case (see 
Proposition 2). 
 
Proposition 2.  At the revenue-sharing equilibrium 
with a single airport, 
1. when carriers provide independent or 
complementary services, (i) outputs and social 
welfare are greater and (ii) under symmetry, prices 
are lower, than in the absence of revenue sharing;  
2. when carriers provide substitutable 
services and are symmetric, (i) outputs and social 
welfare are greater (smaller, respectively) and (ii) 
prices are lower (higher, respectively), than in the 





Proof:  1. We only need to show the price effect for 
complementary services (the other parts have been 
shown in the text). Use Δ  to denote any difference 
of variables between the revenue-sharing regime and 
no-sharing regime. Applying the mean value 
theorem (MVT) to the function ),( *2
*
1 qqp







i qpqpp Δ⋅+Δ⋅=Δ , 
where iip  and 
i
jp  are evaluated at some point 
between ),( 21
OO qq  and ),( 21
CC qq , with 
superscript O denoting variables associated with the 
no-sharing regime. Under symmetry, 
0** >Δ=Δ ji qq  from part (i). Consequently, 





i qppp  with the inequality 






1 >− pppp  
and symmetry: noting that symmetry implies 
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i pp . 
2. (i) Applying MVT to ),( 21
* rrqi  yields 
jjiiiii rrqrrqq Δ∂∂+Δ∂∂=Δ )/()/(
*** , 
with ii rq ∂∂ /
*  and ji rq ∂∂ /
*  evaluated at some 
point between ),( 21
OO rr  and ),( 21
SS rr . Under 












ji ππ  under symmetry and the 
stability and second-order conditions, *iqΔ  must 




ii rrrr =−≡Δ  
(recall 0=Oir ). 
For the welfare comparison, applying MVT to 
),( *2
*
1 qqϕ  in (17) yields
**
jjii qq Δ+Δ=Δ ϕϕϕ , 
where iϕ  and jϕ  are evaluated at some point 
between ),( 21
OO qq  and ),( 21
SS qq . Under 
symmetry, ** ji qq Δ=Δ . Consequently, 
*)( iji qΔ+=Δ ϕϕϕ  has the same sign as
*
iqΔ , 
because 0' >+−= hCp i
i
iϕ . The welfare result 
then follows from the above quantity comparison. 









i qpqpp Δ+Δ=Δ , where iip  and 
i
jp  are evaluated at some point between 
),( 21
OO qq  and ),( 21
SS qq . With ** ji qq Δ=Δ  





i qppp Δ+=Δ  has the 
opposite sign as *iqΔ , because 0<
i
ip  and, by (3), 
0<ijp . The result then follows from the above 
quantity comparison.Q.E.D. 
Although some of the comparisons in 
Proposition 2 are carried out under ‘perfect’ 
symmetry between the firms, a closer look at the 
above proof indicates that small asymmetries won’t 
undermine the results. Proposition 2 shows that 
when carriers offer complementary and unrelated 
services, revenue sharing between an airport and its 
airlines improves welfare. The welfare improvement 
arises because prices exceed marginal costs in the 
oligopolistic airline market and revenue sharing 
reduces prices (or equivalently, expands outputs). 
When carriers provide substitutable services, 
revenue sharing may or may not improve welfare, 
depending on the sign of equilibrium sharing 
proportions Sir . As indicated above, the sign of 
S
ir  
will in turn depend on the degree of substitutability 
between carriers’ services. To capture such an impact, 
we need to impose more structures on the model.13 
Specifically, a linear (inverse) demand is specified: 
ji
i kqbqp −−= 1 , with 0>b  and 
),( bbk −∈ , which ensure downward-sloping 
demands and the own price effects dominating the 
cross price effects. It is clear that carriers’ services 
are complements, independent and substitutes 
when 0<k , 0=  and 0> , respectively. Carriers’ 
marginal costs 1c  and 2c  are constant 
and 21 cc = . In the simulation, parameters are 
chosen to ensure positive outputs and marginal 
revenues. 
Figure 1 reports the effects of airline service 
substitutability, where we define bmk ⋅=  with 
∈m (-0.1, 1). Thus, negative m indicates horizontal 
complementarity, whilst for positive m, larger m’s 
mean increasingly substitutable services. As 
expected, the airport shares a high percentage of 
concession revenue – )( 21 rr =  greater than 1 – 
with airlines when the latter produce complements 
(m < 0) so as to internalize horizontal 
complementarity. The (equilibrium) sharing 
proportions, Sir , fall when airline services become 
increasingly substitutable. When horizontal 
substitutability becomes sufficiently strong, Sir  
turns into a negative value. Such a ‘negative revenue 
sharing’ allows the airport to penalize the 
over-competing airlines so as to support prices in the 
output market and improve profit for the whole 
airport-airlines channel. While carriers pay a higher 
price (than airport charge w) per unit of output, they 
are nevertheless compensated for with fixed 
payments from the airport – noticing in the figure 
that the fixed fee becoming negative.14 In such a 
                                                 
13 Examining how equilibrium results change with substitutability 
(i.e., when airline services become more substitutable to each 
other) is also important, since there are situations in which airports 
or policy makers can ‘moderate’ such substitutability. For example, 
only a few Asian cities are served by multiple airports and as a 
result, low-cost carriers (LCC) are often forced to use the same 
airport as competing full-service carriers (FSC). Recently, airports 
in, e.g., Kuala Lumpur and Singapore chose to build separate LCC 
terminals which offer lower quality of airport service with less 
charge (Zhang et al., 2009). Such a measure would make LCCs’ 
services less substitutable to the services provided by FSCs.  
14 The negative revenue sharing arrangement or its variants are 
also observed in practice. There are cases, for instance, where 
airports may make one-shot investments (for carriers) to offset 
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case, the output and welfare (not shown in Figure 1) 
with revenue sharing (the solid line in the figure) are 
less than those in the no-sharing case (the dotted 
line), as predicted by Proposition 2. Here, while 
revenue sharing improves the total channel profit 
(see the figure), it might reduce social welfare. 
• The horizontal axis corresponds to 
substitutability parameter m, with bmk ⋅= , 
∈m (-0.1, 1) 
• —  Solid Line: Results with share revenue  
• … Dotted Line: Results without revenue 
sharing. 
 
3. Competing Airports 
3.1 Strategic revenue sharing 
We now consider two airports, represented 
by 2,1=i , beginning with a situation of one carrier 
at each airport. (The case of multiple airlines will be 
considered in Section 3.2.) To save notation we 
continue to use ),( 21 qqp
i  for the inverse 
demands faced by carriers, with i denoting the ith 
airport’s carrier (and iq  its output). The two 
airports compete with each other in the sense that 
their airlines’ services are substitutes in the eyes of 
passengers. More specifically, airline revenue 
functions ),( 21 qqR
i  ( i
i qqqp ),( 21= ) satisfy 
the substitutes condition (3). 
Airport-airline behavior is modeled again as a 
two-stage game: In the first stage, each airport offers 
its carrier to share proportion ir  of concession 
revenue ihq  in exchange for fixed fee if , subject 
to the carrier’s participation constraint. In the second 
stage, airlines compete in Cournot fashion with their 
profits given by (4). Given this set-up, the 
second-stage equilibrium is characterized by (5), the 
same condition as in the single-airport case. Further, 
the equilibrium quantities – denoted again as 
),( 21
* rrqi  – have the comparative-static properties 
of Lemma 1: i.e., an increase in the sharing 
proportion by airport i will increase its carrier’s 
output while reducing output of the competing 
airport’s carrier. 
                                                                        
high airport charges. For example, Federal Express (FedEx) had 
been planning to move its Asia Pacific operating center from 
Subic Bay in the Philippines to Guangzhou in China since 2003. 
However, FedEx was concerned about the high operating costs in 
Guangzhou airport due to its high charges for fuel, airport and 
ATC (air traffic control) services which are regulated by the 
central government. To offset these high service charges and 
attract FedEx, the airport agreed to invest US$300 million on 
infrastructures including exclusive aircraft parking space and taxi 
runways for the usage of FedEx. FedEx opened its Asia Pacific 
operating center in Guangzhou in February 2009. It now has 136 
flights per week at the airport. 
Taking the second-stage equilibrium outputs 
into account, each airport’s profit in stage 1 are 
expressed, 
iiii
i fhqrwq +−+=Π ** )1( , 2,1=i . (20) 
The subgame perfect equilibrium then arises when 
each airport chooses its sharing contract ),( ii fr  to 
maximize iΠ , taking its rival’s sharing contract at 
the equilibrium values. This revenue-sharing 
equilibrium with airport competition will be referred 
to as the ‘rivalry (revenue sharing) equilibrium.’ 
Without loss of generality the carriers are again 
assumed to receive their reservation profits i0π , 













ii ≡−+−=Π π .(21) 
The rivalry equilibrium is characterized by the 
first-order conditions, 






i rqvrqv , 
   2,1=i ,                      (22) 
where subscripts again denote partial derivatives  
(e.g., i
ii
i r∂Π∂≡Π / , i
ii
i qvv ∂∂≡ /   
and               j
ii
j qvv ∂∂≡ / ). 









which can by (5) be rewritten as: 
hrwv i
i
i )1( −+= .     (23) 
For the rivalry equilibrium, since 0<= ij
i
j Rv , 
0/* >∂∂ ii rq  and 0/
* <∂∂ ij rq , it follows by (22) 
that 0<iiv . Thus by (23), the equilibrium sharing 
proportions satisfy (superscript R for ‘rivalry 
equilibrium’), 
)/(1 hwr Ri +> , 2,1=i .  (24) 
It is interesting to compare this rivalry 
equilibrium with the ‘non-rivalry (revenue sharing) 
solution,’ which is obtained when the two airports 
were perceived as independent in the sense that 
0),( 21 =qqp
i
j . It can be easily seen from (22)-(23) 
that the non-rivalry sharing proportions are given by 
(superscript N for ‘non-rivalry solution’): 
)/(1 hwr Ni += , 2,1=i .  (25) 
Comparing (25) with (24) leads to: 
Proposition 3.  The revenue-sharing proportions 
are greater at the rivalry revenue-sharing 
equilibrium than under the non-rivalry 
revenue-sharing solution, i.e., Ni
R
i rr >  for 
2,1=i . 
The non-rivalry regime is, from (25) and (12), 
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similar to the case of a single (monopoly) airport 
examined in Section 2, as expected: Like a 
monopoly airport, each airport in the non-rivalry 
regime shares positive proportion 
)/(1 hwr Ni +=  of concession revenue with its 
carrier. While Nir  internalizes the 
flights-concessions demand complementarity, the 
rivalry revenue sharing involves an additional term 




i rr δ+=  – which is unique to the 
case of competing airports. Since this additional 
effect works by indirectly influencing the behavior 
of the rival airport-airline pair – which in turn will 
improve profit of the airport-airline pair in 
question – the rivalry revenue sharing may be 
referred to as the ‘strategic revenue sharing.’ 
Proposition 3 therefore shows that airport 
competition will, owing to this strategic effect, result 
in a higher degree of revenue sharing than would be 
had in the case of single airports. 
Next, the rivalry equilibrium is compared to the 
non-rivalry solution in terms of output, price, profit 
and social welfare. Here, welfare is the sum of 
passenger surplus and profits of the two 
airport-airline pairs; hence, it takes the same form as 
(17). The comparison results are stated as follows: 
Proposition 4.  Under symmetry, at the rivalry 
revenue-sharing equilibrium, (i) outputs are greater, 
(ii) prices are lower, (iii) airport profits are lower, 
and (iv) social welfare is higher, than at the 
non-rivalry revenue-sharing solution. 
Proof:  Use Δ  to denote any difference of 
variables between the rivalry equilibrium and the 
non-rivalry solution. Here, we just show parts (i) and 
(iii); the proofs for parts (ii) and (iv) are similar to 
those of Proposition 2.  
(i) Applying the mean value theorem (MVT) to 
),( 21
* rrqi  
yields jjiiiii rrqrrqq Δ∂∂+Δ∂∂=Δ )/()/(
*** ,  
with ii rq ∂∂ /
*  and ji rq ∂∂ /
*  evaluated at some 
point between ),( 21
NN rr  and ),( 21
RR rr . Under 











ji ππ  under symmetry and the 





*  must have the same sign 
as Ni
R




i rr >  
and hence Ni
R
i qq > . 
(iii) Applying MVT to ),( 21 rr






i rr ΔΠ+ΔΠ=ΔΠ , where iiΠ  




i rrr <<  (using Proposition 3). Since 
ji rr Δ=Δ  under symmetry and  
0>−≡Δ Ni
R
ii rrr , 








i rr −Π+Π=ΔΠ  
and hence 0<ΔΠ i  if (and only if) 
0<Π+Π ij
i












i rqqvv ∂+∂+=Π+Π , 
where iiv  and 
i
jv  are evaluated at 
),( 21
* rrqq ii = . By (23), hrwv i
i
i )1( −+=  
which is negative given that )/(1 hwrr Nii +=> . 
Furthermore, since 0<= ij
i
j Rv  (substitutable 
airports) and 
0)(/)( ** >−⋅=∂+∂ jjj
j
jiiji hrqq ππ , 
 it follows that 0<Π+Π ij
i
i .  
Therefore, 0<Π−Π≡ΔΠ iNiRi . Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4 shows that both airport-airline 
pairs will derive lower profits through this 
revenue-sharing rivalry: the rivalry results in their 
producing too much, thereby depressing the prices 
and profits. In effect, the pairs are trapped by the 
incentive structure of the environment. If one 
airport-airline pair ignores the possibility of strategic 
use of revenue-sharing contracts while the other pair 
shares revenue strategically, the first pair loses while 
the second pair gains relative to the non-strategic 
sharing arrangement. Here the situation is similar to 
a classic Prisoners’ Dilemma. As the airport-airline 
pairs move further away from their joint profit 
maximum through such a revenue-sharing rivalry, 
social welfare nevertheless rises beyond the level 
achievable by single airports.  
 
3.2. Multiple airlines 
Section 3.1 studies the case of one carrier per airport. 
We now extend the analysis to a situation where 
there may be multiple competing airlines at each 
airport. Our second objective in this section is to 
show that the general demand structure used in 
Section 3.1 can be generated through explicit 
considerations of passenger behavior.  
More specifically, our demand derivation 
follows Basso and Zhang (2007) by considering an 
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infinite linear city, where potential consumers are 
distributed uniformly with a density of one consumer 
per unit of length. Two competing airports are 
located at 0 (airport 1) and 1 (airport 2) and there are 
in  carriers at airport i, 2,1=i  (see Figure 2). At 
each airport, carriers produce homogeneous output, 





 and market 
price ip . 
 
catchment areas  
(adapted from Basso and Zhang, 2007) 
The ‘full price’ faced by a consumer located at 
10 ≤≤ z  and who goes to airport 1 is given by 
1 (4 )p t z+ ⋅ , where t4  (>0) represents the 
consumer’s transportation cost from z  to location 
0. By choosing airport 1 or airport 2 (but not both) 
the consumer derives the following respective net 
utilities: 
1
1 (4 )U V p t z= − − ⋅ ,
2
2 (4 ) (1 ),U V p t z= − − ⋅ −    (26) 
where V denotes (gross) benefit from air travel.15 
Assuming everyone in the [0, 1] interval consumes, 
then the indifferent passenger )1,0(~∈z  is 






= + .    (27) 
Given that airport 1 also captures consumers at its 
immediate left side, define lz  as the last passenger 
on the left side of the city who goes to airport 1. 
Similarly, define rz as the last passenger on the 
right side of the city who goes to airport 2. With the 
uniformity and unit density of consumers, lz  and 




l rV p V pz z
t t
− −
= − = +   (28) 
The airports’ catchment areas are shown in Figure 2, 
and their demands are computed as: 
                                                 
15 This is an ‘address model’ with positive linear transportation 
costs, and the differentiation of the two airports is captured by 
consumer transportation cost. Within a multi-airport region, for 
example, passengers may not necessarily choose an airport with 
cheaper airfare, but may go to a nearer airport – see the empirical 
studies by, e.g., Pels et al. (2001), Fournier et al. (2007) and Ishii 
et al. (2009). In addition to distance, other aspects of airport 
differentiation may be captured by extending the present 
formulation. For instance, Pels et al. (2000, 2001, 2003) have 
shown, using a hypothetical example and later the San Francisco 
Bay Area case study, that ground accessibility of an airport is the 
most important factor in affecting airport choices in a 
multi-airport market. Such differential ground access costs could 


























From (29) the inverse demands are given by 
ji
i tQtQVtQQp −−+= 3)2(),( 21 , 
2,1, =ji .                          (30) 
which take the linear functional forms. This demand 
system has the properties of  








1 >=− tpppp , 
 and substitutes condition (3). 
To solve the two-stage airport competition 
game, we begin with an analysis of the second stage 
when airlines engage in intra- and inter-airport 
competition. Suppose for simplicity that carriers 
have linear costs cqFqC +=)( . Consider first 
that the two airports have the same number of 
carriers, i.e., nnn ≡= 21 . Then airline profits can 
be written as: 
1 2 1 2( , , ) ( , )
ik i
ik ik ik ik i ik iQ Q q p Q Q q F cq wq rhq fπ = ⋅ − − − + − . (31) 
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is characterized by 
first-order conditions, 





Q Q q p tq c w rh
q
π∂
= − − − + =
∂
, 
  1,...,k n= ,   2,1=i ,                (32) 
(and the corresponding second-order conditions, 
which hold as 06/ 22 <−=∂∂ tqik
ikπ ). Given the 
underlying symmetry of this set-up, the equilibrium 
quantities are easily obtained: 
*
1 2
[3( 1) ] 2( , )
(2 3)(4 3) (4 3)
i j
ik
n r nr h t V c wq r r
n n t n t




 1,...,k n= ,   2,1=i .              (33) 
 
Back to the first stage of the game, each 
airport’s profit is: 
* *(1 )i i i i iwQ r hQ nfΠ = + − + , 
2,1=i .                        (34) 
With the airline participation constraints, these 








ii FnQhcQQprr π+⋅−+−=Π . (35) 
Hence the rivalry equilibrium is characterized by 
first-order conditions, 
* * * * *[ (1 ) 3( )] ( / ) ( / ) 0ii i i ik i i i j iw r h t Q q Q r tQ Q rΠ= + − − − ⋅ ∂ ∂ − ⋅ ∂ ∂ = , 
2,1=i .                                (36) 
From (36) the equilibrium sharing proportions are 
obtained as, 
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w n t V h cr
h n n h




2,1=i .                               (37) 
Notice from (37) that if 1=n  (each airport has one 
carrier) then Ni
R
i rhwr =+> )/(1 , a result 
obtained in Section 3.1 (see Proposition 3).16 Further, 
it follows from (37) that 0/ <dndr Ri , 2,1=i : 
i.e., the sharing proportions decrease in the number 
of carriers serving the airports. 
For the general case where airports 1 and 2 have 
1n  and 2n  carriers respectively, the inverse 






is the aggregate demand at airport i. Solving the 













… 2,1=i .                              (38) 
Note that when nnn == 21 , the above expression 
reduces to expression (37). From (38) it is 
straightforward to show that 0/ <i
R
i dndr  
and 0/ >j
R
i dndr , leading to: 
Proposition 5.  At the rivalry equilibrium with 1n  
and 2n  carriers at airports 1 and 2 respectively, 
0/ <i
R
i dndr  and 0/ >j
R
i dndr : i.e., the 
revenue-sharing proportion of an airport-airlines 
chain decreases in the number of carriers at its 
airport, and increases in the number of carriers at 
the competing airport. If nnn == 21 , then 
0/ <dndr Ri . 
The intuition behind 0/ <i
R
i dndr  is similar 
to that of Proposition 1 (the substitutes case): As in  
rises (while holding jn  constant) and airline 
competition intensifies, the total industrial output 
becomes increasingly excessive for the ith 
airport-airlines chain. Anticipating this airport i, as a 
first mover, has a greater incentive to discourage 
such excessive production, which can be achieved by 
a smaller sharing proportion.17 While this result is 
                                                 
16 This result can also be shown using demand functions (30) and 
the property of their associated revenue functions 
0i ij j i iR p q tq= = − < . 
17 While the two results have similar intuitions, the present result 
is nevertheless obtained in an environment of competing airports. 
largely expected, the other result, 0/ >j
R
i dndr , is 
not obvious. Here, the explanation is related to the 
‘number of competitors’ effect: An increase in the 
number of firms serving at airport j, while holding 
in  unchanged, would increase airport j’s output 
share in the two-airport market.18 To counter the 
effect, airport i strategically raises the sharing 
proportion so as to induce its carriers to commit to 
greater output. This would credibly deter airport j’s 
carriers from producing more output, which in turn 
improves profit of the ith airport-airline chain. Finally, 
0/ <dndr Ri  for nnn ≡= 21 , indicating that as 
n rises, the (negative) excessive-production effect 
dominates the number-of-competitors effect. 
Like Section 3.1 (which considers one carrier at 
each airport) we can compare the rivalry equilibrium 
with the non-rivalry solution – in the present case 
however, each airport has multiple carriers. It can be 
easily calculated that the non-rivalry sharing 












2,1=i .                                (39) 
Note, first, that if 1=in , (39) reduces to (25) and 
so it extends the formula (25) to the case of multiple 







, 2,1=i ,   (40) 
that is, as the number of firms at a single airport 
increases and hence (uncoordinated) production gets 
increasingly excessive, the airport then has a greater 
incentive to curb production by using a smaller 
sharing proportion. This result is a clear extension of 
Proposition 1 which considers the effect of moving 
from one carrier to two carriers. Finally, comparing 
(39) with (38) yields that R Ni ir r>  for any in  
and jn  ( in  and jn  can take different 
values, 2,1, =ji ): i.e., the revenue-sharing 
proportions are greater at the rivalry revenue-sharing 
equilibrium than under the non-rivalry 
revenue-sharing solution. This extends Proposition 3 
of Section 3.1 to the general case of multiple airports 
with each having an arbitrary number of carriers.19 
                                                 
18 This ‘number of competitors’ effect is related to a well-known 
result found by Salant et al. (1983): in a Cournot market, a merger 
of two firms into one entity reduces the merger partners’ profit 
(unless the merger leads to a monopoly). By internalizing part of 
the effect that a firm’s quantity decision has on the rivals’ profit, 
the merged entity sets its quantity too low, thereby yielding 
market share to the non-participating firms. 
19 Similarly, Proposition 4 (including the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
result) can be extended to the n-carrier case. The derivation is 
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4. Pure Revenue-Sharing Contract 
So far our approach to revenue sharing has focused 
on a ‘two part’ scheme under which an airport 
chooses both a sharing proportion and a lump-sum 
fee on its carriers for the right to share concession 
revenue. While desirable for the airport-airlines 
channel as a whole, such a fixed payment between 
the airport and airlines may not be feasible in 
practice, owing, e.g., to the difficulty in their 
agreeing to the right amount of payment.  
 
In this section we consider a ‘pure’ sharing 
contract under which the fixed fee is constrained to 
zero, while keeping the rest part of the model 
unchanged. Using ‘hat’ to denote the pure 
revenue-sharing equilibrium – i.e., )ˆ,ˆ( 21 rr  – these 
sharing proportions are constrained by the carriers’ 
participation constraints. Unlike the two-part sharing 
scheme, therefore, negative revenue sharing is not 
possible since these carriers cannot be compensated 
for with any fixed payments by the airport, 
indicating 0ˆ ≥ir . Given these observations, the 
effects of the pure revenue-sharing contract will be 
compared to those of the two-part scheme as well as 
the no-sharing regime. 
 
4.1 Single airport 
Consider first a single airport served by two carriers, 
which provide complementary, independent or 
substitutable services. The airport offers carrier i a 
pure sharing contract with sharing proportion ir . 
Each carrier’s profit is given by 
iiiii
ii hqrwqqCqqRqq +−−= )(),(),( 2121π , 
2,1=i .                               (41) 
The stage-2 equilibrium quantities are characterized 
by (5), and are expressed as ),( 21
* rrqi  with 
ii rq ∂∂ /
*  and ij rq ∂∂ /
*  given by (6). Then, the 








121 )1()1()(),( hqrhqrqqwrr −+−++⋅=Π .(42) 
The pure revenue-sharing equilibrium is determined, 
implicitly, by first-order conditions, 
*
1 1 1 1
* *
2 2 1 1
/ [ (1 ) ] ( / )
[ (1 ) ] ( / ) 0
r w r h q r
w r h q r hq
∂Π ∂ = + − ⋅ ∂ ∂
+ + − ⋅ ∂ ∂ − =
,   (43.1) 
*
2 2 2 2
* *
1 1 2 2
/ [ (1 ) ] ( / )
[ (1 ) ] ( / ) 0
r w r h q r
w r h q r hq
∂Π ∂ = + − ⋅ ∂ ∂
+ + − ⋅ ∂ ∂ − =
.   (43.2) 
Multiplying (43.1) by 2
*
1 / rq ∂∂  and then 
                                                                        
available upon request. 
subtracting 1
*
1 /)2.43( rq ∂∂×  yields: 
* *
2 1 2 2 1
* *
1 1 2 2
* * * *
1 1 2 2 1 1
* *
2 1 2 2 1
* *
1 1 2 2
* * * *
1 1 2 2 1 1
[ (1 ) ][( / )( / )
( / )( / )]
[ ( / ) ( / )].
[ (1 ) ][( / )( / )
( / )( / )]
[ ( / ) ( / )].
w r h q r q r
q r q r
h q q r q q r
w r h q r q r
q r q r
h q q r q q r
+ − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂
+ − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂
 
Further, by (6) we have  
2 1 2 1 2
2 12 21 11 22
* * * *
1 1 2 2 1 1
[ (1 ) ][ ( ) / ]
[ ( / ) ( / )]
w r h h J
h q q r q q r
π π π π+ − −
= ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂
 
Since 1 2 1 212 21 11 22 Jπ π π π− = − , it follows that 
* * * *
2 1 1 2 2 1 1[ (1 ) ] [ ( / ) ( / )]w r h h q q r q q r+ − = − ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂  
By Lemma 1, 
*
1 1/ 0q r∂ ∂ >  and 
*
1 2/ 0 and 0q r∂ ∂ = <  
for independent and substitutable services 
respectively, we must have 2(1 ) 0w r h+ − > . 
Similarly, it can be shown that 1(1 ) 0w r h+ − >  
for independent and substitutable services. 
Therefore, 
)/(1ˆ hwr Ii +<     and    )/(1ˆ hwr
S
i +< ,
 2,1=i .                (44) 
For complements however, we need to assume the 
symmetry condition. Under symmetry, we have 
1 2(1 ) (1 )w r h w r h+ − = + −  in (43.1), which 
reduces to: 
* * *
1 1 1 2 1 1[ (1 ) ] ( / / )w r h q r q r hq+ − ⋅ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ = . 
Because *1 1/ 0q r∂ ∂ > , and 
*
1 2/ 0q r∂ ∂ >  for 
complementary services, we must have 
1(1 ) 0w r h+ − > , and so  
)/(1ˆ hwr Ci +< , 2,1=i .   (45) 
 
Proposition 6.  At the pure revenue-sharing 
equilibrium with a single airport,  
1. when carriers provide independent and 
complementary services (assuming symmetric 
carriers in the case of complements), both the 
sharing proportions and social welfare are smaller 
than at the two-part revenue-sharing equilibrium;  
2. when carriers provide substitutable services, 
both the sharing proportions and social welfare may 
be higher or smaller than at the two-part 
revenue-sharing equilibrium. 
 
The proof is relatively straightforward and is 
available upon request from the authors. For the 
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cases of independent or complementary services, the 
airport, being unable to charge the fixed fee under 
the pure revenue sharing, shares less concession 
revenue with its carriers than would be under the 
two-part revenue sharing. This result follows directly 
from comparing (44)-(45) with the sharing 
proportions (12) and (15). This reduction in sharing 
will, by similar arguments used in the proof of 
Proposition 2, reduce social welfare. 
 
For the substitutes case however, although the 
equilibrium sharing proportions are, by (44) and (16), 
less than 1 ( / )w h+  for both types of revenue 
sharing, the sharing-proportions comparison between 
the two types is in general ambiguous. In particular, 
as indicated, while negative sharing is ruled out 
under the pure revenue sharing, it is possible under 
the two-part revenue sharing. In such situations, it 
can be shown that the pure revenue sharing results in 
not only a higher sharing proportion, but also a 
higher welfare level if carriers are sufficiently 
symmetric, than the two-part revenue sharing.  
 
When competing carriers are asymmetric, 
however, there is an interesting twist introduced in 
the sharing-proportions and welfare comparison 
between the pure and two-part sharing arrangement. 
To illustrate the effect, numerical simulations are 
called upon. More specifically, the demands are 
specified as linear: jii
i kqqbp −−= 1  with the 
usual properties of 0>ib  and kbb >21 , . Carrier 
asymmetry is introduced via (i) 21 bb ≠  and/or 
(ii) 21 cc ≠ . Without loss of generality, (i) we set 
2/)( 12 kbb +=  and so )(21 kbb >> ; and (ii) 
we fix 2c  and let 1c  vary. The results are given in 
Figure 3. 
• The horizontal axis corresponds to airline 1’s 
marginal cost ]7.0,25.0[1 ∈c  
• —  Solid Line: Results with the two-part 
revenue sharing 
• … Dotted Line: Results with the pure revenue 
sharing. 
As shown in Figure 3, when firm 1 becomes 
more competitive (smaller 1c ), an airport with the 
two-part revenue sharing will share more revenue 
with this carrier, while reducing the proportion 
shared with the other carrier (firm 2, not shown in 
Figure 3). By further strengthening the increasingly 
efficient carrier’s competitiveness with a higher 
revenue share, and hence greater profit could be 
generated in the airline market, the airport would 
capture greater profit via the fixed transfer payment. 
This is not the case for the pure revenue sharing. 
Under the pure revenue sharing, an airport is more 
concerned with total traffic volume, which 
determines its profit margin, and wants to stimulate 
the traffic with minimum revenue shared (recall that 
the transfer-payment device is no longer available). 
This implies that price elasticities of demand play a 
very important role in the pure revenue sharing. In 
particular, increasing the sharing proportion for a 
carrier with large market share and output (as a result 
of its competitiveness) would likely be more costly 
than doing so with a fringe carrier. As can be seen 
from the figure, an airport under the pure revenue 
sharing shares less with firm 1 as it becomes more 
competitive. While carrier 1’s output may be higher 
or lower under the two-part revenue sharing than 
under the pure revenue sharing, total output and 
hence welfare are, at least for the parameter values 
used in Figure 3, higher under the former than the 
latter (note that here, the relevant range of 
comparison is for 0ˆ ≥ir ). This is because, when 
competing carriers are asymmetric in costs and 
demands, an airport under the two-part revenue 
sharing has a tendency to influence the market 
equilibrium toward the efficient direction, which 
enhances social welfare.  
 
Finally, the pure revenue sharing can also be 
compared to the no-sharing regime. It can be shown 
that at the pure revenue-sharing equilibrium, prices 
are lower, and both outputs and welfare are greater, 
than in the absence of revenue sharing. These results 
hold irrespective of the carriers’ producing 
complementary, unrelated or substitutable services. 
The proofs are analogous to the proofs of 
Proposition 2, with some of the results requiring that 
carriers be reasonably symmetric. 
 
4.2 Competing airports 
Next consider two competing airports, each served 
by one carrier. The stage-2 equilibrium quantities are 
again characterized by (5) and are given 
by ),( 21
* rrqi , which have comparative-static 
property 0/* >∂∂ ii rq , 2,1=i . Then each airport’s 






i −+=Π , 
and the pure revenue-sharing equilibrium is 
characterized by first-order conditions, 
0)/(])1([ ** =−∂∂⋅−+=Π iiii
i
i hqrqhrw , 
2,1=i .                                (46) 
From (46) and 0/* >∂∂ ii rq , it follows that 




ii rrhwr <=+<≤ )/(1ˆ0 , 2,1=i .   (47) 
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The following results are then obtained (part 2’s 
proof is analogous to Proposition 2’s): 
Proposition 7.  At the pure revenue-sharing 
equilibrium with competing airports, 
1. the sharing proportions are smaller (greater, 
respectively) than at the two-part revenue-sharing 
equilibrium; and 
2. under symmetry, (i) outputs and welfare are 
smaller (greater, respectively) and (ii) prices are 
higher (lower, respectively) than at the two-part 
revenue-sharing equilibrium (the no-sharing 
equilibrium, respectively). 
Proposition 7 indicates that under airport 
competition, the pure revenue sharing improves 
social welfare relative to the no-sharing regime, 
albeit less effective than the two-part revenue 
sharing. In general, in terms of airfare, traffic volume 
and social welfare, the pure revenue sharing with 
competing airports lies in between the no-sharing 
and two-part revenue sharing regimes. It is also 
worth noting that unlike the ambiguous result for the 
single airport, the pure revenue sharing 
unambiguously entails a smaller sharing proportion 
than the two-part revenue sharing. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
This paper has investigated the implications of 
concession revenue sharing between an airport and 
its airlines. Earlier studies show that such sharing 
allows an airport to internalize the demand 
complementarity between flights and concessions, 
and may improve both the profit and social welfare. 
We found that the degree of sharing will be further 
affected by how carriers’ services are related 
(complements, independent, or substitutes). In 
particular, when carriers provide substitutable 
services, the sharing proportions might become 
negative if horizontal substitutability is sufficiently 
strong and the fixed (transfer) payments between the 
airport and carriers are feasible (the two-part revenue 
sharing). The negative sharing allows the airport to 
penalize the over-competing airlines so as to support 
prices in the output market and improve profit. In 
these situations, while revenue sharing improves the 
total airport-airlines channel profit, it reduces social 
welfare. If the fixed payments are not feasible, under 
the resulting pure revenue sharing the airport will, 
for the cases of independent or complementary 
services, share less concession revenue with its 
carriers than would be under the two-part revenue 
sharing. For the substitutes case however, the 
sharing-proportions comparison between the two 
types is in general ambiguous. In the special case of 
negative sharing, the pure revenue sharing results in 
not only a higher sharing proportion, but also a 
higher welfare level if carriers are sufficiently 
symmetric, than the two-part revenue sharing. We 
further found that carrier asymmetry tends to favor 
the two-part revenue sharing, in terms of enhancing 
welfare, over the pure revenue sharing. 
 
Our second objective in writing this paper is to 
extend the existing literature on airport-airline 
vertical cooperation to the general case of multiple 
competing airports with each having an arbitrary 
number of carriers. We found that airport 
competition will result in a higher degree of revenue 
sharing than would be had in the case of single 
airports. Nevertheless, the airport-airline chains may 
derive lower profits through this revenue-sharing 
rivalry: in effect, the airports are trapped by the 
incentive structure of the environment, and the 
situation is similar to a classic Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
As the airport-airline chains move further away from 
their joint profit maximum, social welfare rises 
beyond the level achievable by single airports. Our 
analysis also showed that the (equilibrium) 
revenue-sharing proportion at an airport decreases in 
the number of its carriers, and increases in the 
number of carriers at the competing airport. Airline 
market structure will therefore influence revenue 
sharing arrangements not only at the airport in 
question, but also at the competing airports. 
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Figure 1. Revenue sharing vs. no sharing: Single airport with two carriers 
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Figure 3. Two-part revenue sharing vs. pure revenue sharing: Single airport with two carriers 
(Parameter values: 00001.01 =b , 000085.02 =b , k = 0.00007, 55.02 =c , w = 0.1, h = 0.3) 
 
